Resources for the SolarWinds Breach

In this new white paper, RiskRecon provides a view from the Internet of the SolarWinds Orion breach that has yielded important lessons for managing enterprise cybersecurity risks.

Upon disclosure of the SolarWinds breach, RiskRecon immediately focused its open-source intelligence analytics engines on helping its customers and the larger community to identify potentially breached companies. This blog dives into how RiskRecon has monitored SolarWinds' exposure, providing a valuable view into how companies have responded to the incident.

RiskRecon is making the list of potentially impacted entities available to risk professionals. If you would like to receive the data file containing the list of the companies identified, along with the associated data, please click the learn more button and our Customer Support team can validate your request.

RiskRecon’s analysis of nearly 140,000 SUNBURST C2 subdomains reveals 129 distinct entities potentially signaling to the SUNBURST command and control servers, ranging from defense contractors to the United Nations. This blog post details the analysis conducted by the RiskRecon team including the Data Sources and Methodology.

Suspected Chinese hackers exploited a flaw in software made by SolarWinds Corp to help break into U.S. government computers last year, five people familiar with the matter told Reuters, marking a new twist in a sprawling cybersecurity breach that U.S. lawmakers have labeled a national security emergency.

The hackers had accessed at least one of the company’s Office 365 accounts by December 2019, and then leapfrogged to other Office 365 accounts used by the company, Sudhakar Ramakrishna said in an interview Tuesday.

Krebs on Security provides in-depth coverage on the possible ecosystem of the breach that could affect as many as 18,000 SolarWinds customers.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is aware of compromises of U.S. government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations by an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor beginning in at least March 2020. This APT actor has demonstrated patience, operational security, and complex tradecraft in these intrusions. CISA expects that removing this threat actor from compromised environments will be highly complex and challenging for organizations.

This page contains a web-friendly version of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Emergency Directive 21-01, “Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise”.